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court extinguishing the rights of a resident of California in an
insurance policy, although the debtor company was before the Penn-
sylvania court.Y2 If this case be followed, the rule of Harris. v. Balk
will not be extended by the United States Supreme Court to other
than garnishment cases. (But see the very recent case of Hartford
Life Insurance Co. v. Barber, which requires the Supreme Court of
Missouri to recognize a Connecticut. decree extinguishing the rights of
a Missouri beneficiary who Was not 'before the Connecticut court.Y3 )
Aside, however, from the statutory differentiation, which, it should be
noted, has not been urged by the cases, is there any reason why such an
extension would fail to be due process of law? Is there any valid
ground, when the analogy of garnishment cases is considered, for
holding the decree in Perry v. Young and that of the lower court in
Minnesota so utterly unreasonable as to be not due process? It is
somewhat difficult to see that there is.
M. S. B.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND STATE COMPENSATION ACTS
The Supreme Court of the United States, by that five to four
division, unfortunately so usual in the determination of important
constitutional questions, has ruled that state workmen's compensa-
tion acts cannot apply to any cases coming within the jurisdiction of
admiralty. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 524-
This decision was given upon the same day that another important
limitation upon the extent of state compensation acts was announced
nNew York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy (1916) 241 U. S. si8, 36 Sup. Ct. 613.
Cf. Kelly v. Norwich Un. Fire Ins. Soc. (i89i) 82 Ia. i37, 47 N. W. 986, refusing
to admit as evidence the record of a suit in a lower court of New York against
the insurance society to extinguish Kelly's rights, he, a resident of Iowa, not
having been served in New York. The New York Court of Appeals adopted the
Iowa view and later reversed the Supreme Court Order which had been dis-
regarded in Iowa. Mahr V, Norwi'ch Un. Fire Ins. Soc. (i8gi) i27 N. Y. 452,
28 N. E. 391. Cf. Stevenson v. Anderson (1814, Ch.) 2 Ves. & B. 407, 411, in
which Lord Eldon held he would protect the plaintiff against the claims of
non-residents who had been personally served outside the jurisdiction and who
refused to appear.
's (i917 U. S. Sup. Ct.) Nov. xgth, October term, No. 252. It appears that in
this case the insurance company was not a debtor but a trustee of a particular
fund. Barber v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. (1916) 269 Mo. 21, 27, 187 S. W. 867.
See (i916) 25 YAm LAw JoURWAL, 324 and Comment to follow in YALEn LAw
Jout AL for January, i918.
'Reversing (915) 215 N. Y. 514, L. R. A. 19x6 A, 4o3, 1o9 N. E. 6oo, Ann.
Cas. z9x6 B, 276, 9 N. C. C. A. 286. On the same day and upon the same
principles the Supreme Court decided Clyde S. S. Co. v. Walker (917) 37 Sup.
Ct 545 (four justices dissenting) reversing (i915) 215 N. Y. 529, 1o9 N. F. 6o4,
Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 87, but refused to take similar action in an Ohio case on the
ground that the point was not raised in the trial court Valley S. S. Co. V.
Wattawa (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. M.
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in a decision 2 elsewhere commented upon.3 The decision in the
Jensen case is of great interest not only in its bearing upon
compensation law, but also because of its importance upon the
entire question of maritime law as well as the intrinsic interest
of the opinions rendered. Mr. Justice McReynolds spoke for
the majority of the court. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting
opinion containing an unusual number of the epigrammatic state-
ments for which he is renowned, while Mr. Justice Pitney, con-
curring substantially with Mr. justice Holmes, gave a dissenting
opinion so full, so complete and so persuasive as seemingly to
exhaust the subject. Mr. Justice Brandeis. and Mr. Justice Clarke
concurred in the dissent.
The New York Workmen's Compensation Commission had
made an award, sustained by the state courts,5 to the widow and
children of one Jensen, who had been killed while in the employ
of the Southern Pacific Company, a common carrier by rail-
road also owning and operating a steamship line between New
York and Galveston, Texas. Jensen operated an electric track
from the steamship across a gangway to a pier in North River,
New York City, and while thus assisting in unloading the cargo
of lumber, sustained the accidental injury causing his death. The
majority of the Supreme Court hold that, the matter being
maritime and within the jurisdiction of admiralty, the state
compensation act conflicts with the grant of admiralty jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts by the United States Constitution and
is to that extent invalid. 6
Article 3, Section 2, of the federal Constitution extends the
judicial power of the United States "to all cases of admiralty
'N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield (I917) 37 Sup. Ct. 546 (Justices
Brandeis and Clarke dissenting), holding that Congress, by enacting the
Federal Employers' Liability Act had excluded state action concerning
injuries sustained during employment by employees of interstate railway
carriers. As the Court in the Winfield case held that Congress had by
this Act covered the field of such injuries, while in the Jensen case it
held that the Act did not apply to injuries sustained upon an ocean going
steamship not a mere adjunct of an interstate railway, the two cases
present the distinction that in the one Congress had acted, while in the
other it had not.
s See 27 YAlE LAw Jou-NAL 135.
'Thus he says "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign
that can be identified." In another place he remarks "I recognize without
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.
'See note i, above.
' The general constitutionality of the New York compensation statute
was upheld in New York Central R. Co. v. White (917) 243 U. S. 188,
37 Sup. Ct 247.
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and maritime jurisdiction." In 1789 Congress enacted that the
district courts of the United States should have "exclusive
original cognizance of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it.'" This grant has been continued.8 The majority opinion
holds that the saving clause does not here apply, as the remedy
which the Compensation Act attempts to give was unknown to
the common law. The court recognizes that certain state laws
affecting maritime matters are upheld but attempts to formulate
a test that no such legislation is valid "if it contravenes the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uni-
formity of that law in its international and interstate relations."
A state statute exceeding these limitations is invalid even though
Congress has not legislated upon the point covered by the state
statute, just as in certain cases connected with interstate com-
merce, silence of Congress is equivalent to a declaration that
commerce shall be free. Conflicting state compensation acts
applicable to maritime matters would destroy that uniformity
which the constitutional provision was designed to secure. And
finally, this form of remedy is not in harmony with. the policy
of Congress to encourage investments in ships, manifested in the
acts limiting the liability of ship owners to the amount of their
investment.9
It would seem that the case might have been decided otherwise
under the authority of the saving clause of the Act of 1789, the
constitutionality of which seems never to have been doubted. The
framers of that act by their reference to the common law
' Section 9, Judiciary Act of 1789 (i Stat. at L. 76, 77, ch. 20, sec. 9).
'Judicial Code, sections 24, 256 (36 Stat. at L. io9i, ii6o, ch. 213;
Comp. Stat, x9i6, sections 991 (i), 1233).
' Comp. Stat, i916, sections 8o2i-8o23, 8o28. In State v. Daggett (i975)
87 Wash. 253, 15I Pac. 648, L. I. A. 1916 A 446, the Washington Supreme
Court had decided that the Compensation Act of that state could not apply
to maritime injuries, as Congress, having legislated upon the matter in
the limited liability statutes, had excluded state action. Most of the
state decisions, however, were contrary to the ruling of the Jensen case.
See the well considered cases of Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co.
(19r5) 89 Conn. 367, 373, L. R. A. 1916 A 436, 94 At. 372; Lindstrom v.
Mutual S. S. Co. (1916) 132 Minn. 328, L. R. A. 1916 D 935, I56 N. W.
669; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n. (917, Cal.) 163
Pac. 799; also the New York decisions, ante note r; also Keithley v.
North Pacific S. S. Co. (1916, D. Oreg.) 232 Fed. 255, 259; Stoll v. Pacific
Coast S. S. Co. (ig3, W. D. Wash.) 205 Fed. i6g. Schuede v. Zenith
S. S. Co: (1914, N. D. Oh.) 216 Fed. 566 was in accord with the Jensen
case.
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apparently meant simply the system of law enforced in the
ordinary courts as distinguished from the admiralty courts, and
did not mean that restricted, though uncertainly limited, body of
law which excludes both equity and statutory law.10 Moreover,
the Supreme Court seems so to have decided cases which, though
not overruled by this case, are difficult of reconciliation with it,
notably those cases which have applied state statutes creating
a remedy for death by wrongful act-a remedy unknown to
the common law-to maritime cases, both those brought in the
state courts" and those brought in the admiralty courts. 2
But broader grounds than the mere wording of the Act made
it desirable that the state statute should have been sustained.
Mr. Justice Pitney seems clearly right in pointing out that the
framers of the Constitution in the provision concerning admiralty
matters intended merely to establish jurisdiction and not to
prescribe particular codes or systems of law; to enumerate
rather than define the powers granted.V 3 This jurisdiction was
not in terms made exclusive and, as the decisions of the Supreme
Court show, it was not exclusive under the rules of admiralty
law with two exceptions. These exceptions were prize cases
and civil cases brought under the peculiar "in rem" proceedings
of admiralty where a judgment against all parties in interest
is obtained by process against the thing itself to enforce a mari-
time lien, which, unlike a common law lien, does not rest upon
possession of the property. In all other cases the common law
is competent to give a remedy and its jurisdiction is concurrent.
Hence state statutes attempting to give maritime liens enforced
by in rem proceedings are invalid," ' but other state statutes bear-
1 Speaing of the saving clause of this statute, Mr. Justice Holmes, in
The Hamilton (Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore) (I907) 207 U. S.
398, 404, V L. Ed. 264, 28 Sup. Ct in, said: "And as the state courts
in their decisions would follow their own notions about the law and
might change them from time to time, it would be strange if the state
might not make changes by its other mouthpiece, the legislature." See
also American S. B. Co. v. Chase (1872) I6 WalL 522, 21 L. Ed. 369.
"tSherlock v. Ailing (1876) 93 U. S. 99, 23 L. Ed. 819; American S. B.
Co. v. Chase (1872) 16 Wall. 522, 21 L. Ed. 369.
1 The Hamilton (Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore) (x907) 207 U. S.
398, 52 L. Ed. 264, 28 Sup. Ct. 133; La Bourgogne (Deslions v. La Com-
panie Ginirale Transatlantique) (I07) 210 U. S. 95, 52 L. Ed. 973, 28
Sup. Ct 664.
" Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wheat i, I8g, i94, 6 L. Ed. 23, 68, 69;
M'Culloch v. Maryland (x89) 4 Wheat 316, 407, 4 L. E . 579, 6o.
1 The Moses Taylor (1866) 4 Wall. 411, 18 L. Ed. 397; The Hine v.
Trevor (1866) 4 Wall. 555, x8 L. Ed. 451; The Glide (1896) 167 U. S.
6o6, 42 L. Ed. 296, 17 Sup. Ct. 930. A state statute creating a lien for
materials used in repairing a foreign ship is invalid. The Roanoke (i9gO)
i89 U. S. 185, 47 L.- Ed. 770, 23 Sup. Ct 491. But not for repairs of a
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ing upon maritime matters, including statutes aiding proceedings
in personam by allowing attachments of the interest of owners
in vessels, are upheld.15 Admiralty courts have enforced state
legislation in the absence of similar legislation upon the part of
Congress." All the more then should the state act be enforced
in the state court when the suitor has chosen the state tribunal
rather than the admiralty court for the determination of his
rights.17
Moreover, there is no body of law forming a complete
admiralty code. Mr. Justice Holmes, by an ingenious and per-
tinent argument, demonstrates that the wholly incomplete mari-
time law is supplemented by common law principles 8 If
maritime law does thus include common law, and common law
with its statutory changes such as the remedy for death by
wrongful act, it is difficult to see how this common law is
excluded from admiralty by the mere conferring of admiralty
jurisdiction by the federal Constitution upon the federal
courts.
The lack of uniformity which the majority feared would result
from an enforcement of state compensation acts in maritime
matters would be at least a difficulty no greater than the like lack
of uniformity in the application of laws to interstate commerce
before Congress partly 9overed the situation by the passage of
the federal Employers' Liability Act. At most the matter is
one for the legislative department to deal with, and it seems
not to be doubted that Congress might act in this case and that
state laws would then be superseded. Yet it is doubtful if an
act in the nature of an admiralty compensation act is desirable.
The state machinery of compensation commissions (which is
vessel in her home port. The Lottawanna (Rodd v. Heartt) (1874) 21
Wall. 558, 22 L. Ed. 6 54; The J. E. Rumbell (1892) 148 U. S. 1, 37 L. Ed.
345, 13 Sup. Ct. 498. See also Workman v. New York (1goo) 179 U. S.
552, 45 L. Ed. 314, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212.
'Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co. (1914) 237 U. S. 303, 59
L. Ed. 966, 35 Sup. C. 596; Knapp S. & Co. v. McCaffrey (1899) x77 U. S.
638, 44 L. Ed. 921, 2o Sup. Ct. 824, citing cases.
s See notes 12 and 14, supra.
' It is clear that different rules may apply accordingly as a case is
brought in the state or in the admiralty court. Compare The Max Morris
(x8go) 137 U. S. I, 34 L Ed. 586, 11 Sup. Ct. and Atlee v. Northwestern
Union Packet Co. (1874) 21 Wall. 389, 395, 396, 22 L Ed. 619, as to the
effect of contributory negligence in admiralty.
"The argument in brief is that as the Supreme Court has permitted a
recovery for a maritime tort upon ;ommon law principles, as in Atlantic
Transport Co. v. Imbrovek (1913) 234 U. S. 52, 58 L. Ed. 12o8, 51 L. R. A.
(N. S.) z157, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, and as the judges without legislation could
not engraft the common upon the maritime law, therefore fhe maritime
law actually includes in part the common law.
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necessary in view of the many purely local contracts of em-
ployment) ought not to be duplicated by federal machinery
occupying much the same field. Moreover, as the risk resulting
from the liability imposed by various state compensation acts
may be transferred without difficulty to an insurance company,
the practical hindrance to commerce would be small. Then, while
a uniform act is desirable in some fields of law, such as bank-
ruptcy, it is questionable whether compensation to dependents
of injured employees-the real object of compensation acts-
ought to be uniform in all parts of the country, no matter how
the cost of living may vary. Local legislatures and tribunals
are perhaps better fitted to determine the amount of the
compensation.1 9
The limited liability acts furnish no obstacle. They are, of
course, paramount in both state and federal courts and would
operate to place a maximum upon the amount allowable in cer-
tain cases, though only the worst forms of marine disaster ordi-
narily make an appeal to the benefits of the statutes of any
aid to the ship owner. But this limitation of liability has been
applied to claims for death damages based upon state statutes,2 0
and may just as easily be applied to claims for compensation.
The practical results of the decision are unfortunate. The
earlier cases a~re apparently not to be considered as overruled,
but even if they were the situation would hardly be cleared.
In either event it would be impossible to tell just what was
included in the maritime law. The only test would be the nebu-
lous one set forth by the majority in this case. How certain a
test that is may be imagined when we consider that here five
justices thought the limitations were exceeded, while four
justices thought the objections not well taken. The test hithkerto
applied certainly was more explicit. Then, too, it may be
doubted whether freedom of commerce will be aided by the
lack of a compensation act in admiralty, since modern experience
tends to show the value and the necessity of compensation acts.
To induce labor to turn to the sea, Congress will probably have
to create some compensation remedy applicable to admiralty
and thus perhaps uselessly duplicate state compensation organiza-
tions, thereby obtaining in maritime matters a uniformity of
remedy which does not take into consideration the variations
of local conditions. Hence, a policy which refuses state assistance
in control of maritime affairs before Congress has shown that
See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in New York Central
R. Co. v. Winfield (1917) 37 Sup. Ct 546.
"See cases in note 12, above.
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assistance undesirable may not be the most desirable policy under
all circumstances. 21  C.E.C.
THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CASES
To Lord Fry, specific performance without "mutuality" was
inconceivable.1 The supposed principle proves, however, on
careful analysis to have so many exceptions as to be valueless
as a generalization.2 Indeed when all the exceptions to Lord
Fry's broad statement are considered, the true doctrine of
want of mutuality as a defense to specific performance narrows
down to this: Equity will not grant the plaintiff specific per-
formance of a bilateral contract if, after the defendant's forced
performance, the plaintiff's own obligation will rmain unper-
formed and is of such a nature that, at the time for its fulfillment,
equity would, on grounds independent of mutuality, refuse specific
performance of it,-the one possible limitation to this rule being
that equity might give the plaintiff specific performance if the
defendant's assumed common law remedy for damages would
be fully adequate.8 But some jurisdictions, following the lead
of the federal Supreme Court, have carried the supposed broad
doctrine of mutuality to the extreme extent of applying it to
cases where there is no want of mutuality of- remedy as such, but
only a. want of mutuality 'in the substantive rights and powers
of the parties.4 Thus it has been held that covenants in leases
" Since the above was written, it has been brought to the writer's atten-
tion that Congress, by an act approved October 6, 1917, has amended the
Act of 1789, cited in notes 7 and 8 supra, by adding to the saving clause
the words: "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the work-
men's compensation law of any state." See 244 Fed. 420 (General and
Permanent Acts of Congress). Does not this amendment lead to an
interesting dilemma? If the Act of x789 is constitutional-and it has
always been so considered, and was so considered by the majority in the
Jensen case-it wpuld seem beyond question that the amendment is
also constitutional. Yet the majority in the Jensen case hold that state
compensation acts interfere with the grant of admiralty jurisdiction con-
tained in the United States Constitution. Hence the amendment must be
unconstitutional. Cf. Comment by Professor Wright, 6 CAr- L. REv. 72,
n. i8. The writer of this interesting comment states that the holding of
the majority in the Jensen case that the saving clause of the act did not
apply was merely a dictum. It is difficult to see how the majority in
reaching their conclusion could have avoided a direct decision either that
the statute was unconstitutional or that it did not apply.
'Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d ed.) 225.
'See 36 Cyc. 621..
' Wakeham v. Barker (1887) 82 Cal. 46, 22 Pac. 1131 (exemplifying the
true rule); cf. Jones v. Newhall (1874) iu5 Mass. 244 (inferentially
supporting the suggested limitation).
'Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley (1869, U. S.) io Wall 339.
